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RIGHT TO WORK LAW ISSUES: AN
EVIDENTIARY APPROACH
DANIEL H. POLLITT*
In 1944, Florida enacted the first right-to-work law: "The right to
persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of member-
ship or non-membership in any labor union, or labor organization."'
In 1947, Congress expressly provided in section 14(b) of the Taft-
Hartley Act that the individual states would be free to make any
right-to-work laws they might enact applicable to inter-state as well as
to intra-state commerce.2 With this congressional go-ahead, ten states,
located primarily in the Southeastern portion of the United States, im-
mediately followed Florida's lead with the enactment of right-to-work
laws.
Thereafter each succeeding year saw right-to-work law proposals
before the voters or legislative bodies of one or more states. In 1958,
such laws were on the ballots in six states: approved in agricultural
Kansas, rejected in Washington, Colorado and Idaho, and overwhelming-
ly defeated in industrial Ohio and California.3 The issue of right-to-
work has reached the ballot or legislative stage of development in at
least forty states: nineteen states, mostly in the South, North Central,
and Rocky Mountain area, have adopted them; four other states first
adopted and then repealed them; and twenty states, mostly industrial,
have rejected them.4 The matter is not at end, however, as labor groups
Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
1 FLA. CONST. DEcLArAioN OF RIGHTS, § 12 (1944). The constitutionality of
state right-to-work laws was sustained over union objection that they (1) violate
freedoms of speech, press and assembly, (2) impair the obligation of existing con-
tracts, and (3) deprive unions and employers of equal protection and due process
of law. Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949) ; AFL v. Ameri-
can Sash Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949).
' "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or
application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or
application is prohibited by State or Territorial law." 61 STAT. 151 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 164(b) (1952). One commentator concludes that this provision authorizes
states to outlaw labor-management contracts requiring union membership as a
condition of continued employment, but not those contracts requiring the non-union
employee to contribute an amount equivalent to union dues. Toner, The Taft-
Hartley Union Shop Does Mot Force Anyone To Join a Union, 6 LAB. L.J. 690,
695 (1955). This issue is of little practical importance however, as a union which
charges fees from services rendered non-members thereby jeopardizes its status
as the bargaining agent. Hughes Tool Company, 104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1953).
'N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1958, p. 19, col. 1.
'The status of right-to-work law legislation in the 48 states is given in
SULTAN, RIGHT-To-WoRK LAWS: A STUDY iN Col -icr 56-61 (1958).
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have announced a purpose to seek repeal of state laws where they exist
and, the amendment of that portion of the federal labor law which
permits their enactment.5 The problem of "right-to-work" will prob-
ably continue as a societal issue for years to come.
The recurrent problem presented by right-to-work legislation has
caused great public debate. It takes twenty-three typewritten pages to
list the articles carried on the subject by various periodicals." Yet the
high emotional intensity engendered by these debates has never been
matched by a corresponding degree of knowledge. A Northwestern
University law professor recently asked his class whether a union and
a company should be permitted to agree voluntarily that all employees
represented by the union in the plant should become members of the
union. Of the 125 students, 84 answered yes and 41 no. Yet when
the same question was asked in different terms, viz., "Are you in favor
of 'right-to-work' laws?" there was a complete turnabout. Eighty
answered yes and 45 no.
7
A public member of the Wage Stabilization Board, commenting on
1,350 letters he received when the issue of union-security was pending
before the Board, tells us that these letter writers "perhaps the majority,
know little or nothing about union security, and much of what they
think they know is wrong." s
RIGHT-To-WORi-LAWS
The term "right-to-work" is misleading. The states of Washington
and Idaho refused to permit proponents of this measure to utilize the
term on the ballot for this reason.9 Right-to-work laws have nothing to
do with full employment. The unemployed individual who wrote the
Denver Post that he favored a right-to-work law because "it is about
time that we had a state law that would guarantee a man the right to
work' 0 was doomed to disappointment. Right-to-work law proponents
frankly state that "the right to work does not mean the right of a
particular individual to a particular job. The job is created by the
employer, and the right to hire should remain in the employer's hands.""
Nor are right-to-work laws to be confused with laws designed to elimi-
nate racial, religious, or national origin discrimination in employment
I N.Y. Times, March 3, 1959, p. 18, col. 1.
'Hutchinson and Patterson, List of Publications on the Right-to-Work Ques-
tion (1958).
7Toledo Union Journal, Feb. 21, 1958, p. 4, col. 1-2.
' Aaron, Public Opinion and the Union Shop, 2 SOUTHERN EcONOMIc JOURNAL
74, 80 (1953).
'AFL-CIO, UNION SECURITY, THE CASE AGAINST THE "RIGHT-TO-WORK"
LAWS 26 (1958) (hereinafter cited as AFL-CIO, UNION SECURITY).
10 Quoted in Cheit, Union Security and the Right to Work, 6 LAB. L.J. 360
(1955).
" Information distributed by the DeMille Foundation (organized to secure
right-to-work laws) and quoted in SULTAN, op. cit. sipra note 4, at 80.
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practices. The DeMille Foundation states that "our opponents some-
times try to persuade the unwary that a Right To Work law is a fiendish
substitute for an F.E.P. bill. It is not."'21 It is far more accurate to
describe such legislative measures as "voluntary union membership"
laws rather than "right-to-work" laws as their principal purpose is to
outlaw "compulsory unionism" by making it illegal for management and
a union to sign an agreement requiring all employees to join the union
and/or pay union dues as a condition of continued employment, i.e. to
sign what are known as "union security" agreements.
"UNION SECURITY" AGREEmENTS
The term "union security" agreements is used to describe a variety
of contractual provisions between management and unions designed to
strengthen the union by giving it some degree of control over the
individual employee. Union security agreements take many forms.
The most prevalent are as follows.
Closed Shop. A closed shop agreement is one whereby the employer
agrees to hire only union members whenever there is a vacancy in his
labor force. In other words, one must join the union before he is
eligible for employment.
Union Shop with Preferential Hiring. This form of union security
device requires the employer to give preference to union members in
hiring and additionally requires all employees to join the union within a
specified probationary period, generally thirty or sixty days.
Union Shop. The employer need give no preference to union mem-
bers when hiring, but he does agree to require all employees to join the
union within a specified length of time and to remain members during
the period of employment.
Maintenance of Membership. Under a "maintenance of member-
ship" agreement all employees who are members of a union at the signing
of the collective bargaining agreement and all employees who later join
the union must retain their membership for the duration of the agree-
ment. Many of these agreements permit a fifteen-day period at the
beginning of the contract term during which members may withdraw
from the union if they do not wish to retain membership for the duration
of the agreement.
Maintenance of Union Dues. Under this type of agreement, the
employer can "check off" or withhold the union dues from the union
member's pay check and deliver it directly to the union. This type of
arrangement is similar to "withholding" income taxes.
Union security devices are nothing new in this country. A Boston
court in 1675 recognized the right of carpenters to refuse to work with
19 Ibid.
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non-union members. The New York colonial court in 1674 ordered
brewers and bakers to hire only union members as "formerly was ac-
customed.' 3  When the rope makers organized in Philadelphia in
1698, the closed shop principle well may have furnished the inspirations
of their Motto: "May the production of our trade be the neckcloth of
him who attempts to untwist the political rope of our Union."' 4 Prior
to the Civil War the cordwainers, the carpenters, the cigar makers, the
tailors, the glass blowers, the hatters, the shoemakers, the mule spinners,
the carpet weavers, the stone cutters, the potters, and the longshoremen
had all formed unions with provisions similar to that found in the 1842
constitution of the Baltimore Typographical Society: "Every person
working at the business will be required to make application to join this
Society within one month from the tme of his commencing work at any
office in the city .... On the refusal or neglect to comply with these
regulations ... the members of this Society will cease to work in any
office where such person may be employed."' 5
Not only are union security devices of ancient lineage, they were also
in common use. In 1946, the year preceding the enactment of the Taft-
Hartley Act, slightly over 11 million of the approximate 15 million em-
ployees working under collective bargaining agreements were covered
by some form of union security device: maintenance of membership
agreements-3,695,000; closed shop agreement-3,357,000; union shop
agreements-2,597,000; union shop with preferential hiring-,497,000.
Why were union security agreements so prevalent? Why did and
do unions deem it desirable to sign "closed shop" and other agreements
requiring membership in a union as a condition of employment? There
were and are four principal reasons, reasons which often overlap and
duplicate one another.
First, in many situations there can be no union without a union
security agreement. This is true in those industries marked by sporadic
employment of relatively short duration such as the construction in-
dustry, the maritime industry, the tourist resort industry, the entertain-
ment industry, and others. The union agreement must be made before
employment begins or not at all. Assuming the captain of a ship was
authorized by his employer to bargain with the crew, the voyage would
be over and the crew paid off before the men could organize a union,
elect officers, thrash out demands, and negotiate a contract with the
captain. In the building trades industry, it is impossible to choose a
union, elect a spokesman, and negotiate a contract before the job is com-
pleted and the employees scattered. In addition, as the character of the
work changes on a construction job, there is a constant shifting of the
" TONER, THE CLOSED SHOP 59-61 (1942).
11 Id. at 7.
11 STOCKTON, THE CLOsED SHOP IN AmERICAN TRADE UNIONS 20 (1911).
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work force. Excavation men, first on the job, will be followed by
carpenters, laborers, bricklayers, electricians, tile layers, plasterers, etc.
Frequently, a contractor may have several jobs in one area and shift his
employees as required by progress on each job. The shifting character
of employment on a single job makes it impossible to determine the
appropriate craft or class or unit of employees that should be represented,
and hence makes it impossible for a union to be organized, recognized,
and go into operation prior to the termination of the job.'0 In 1953,
the United States Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, after
an investigation of this matter, concluded that "the indiscriminate ban
on the so-called dosed shop in the Taft-Hartley law has produced a
disruption of labor markets in industries with casual or intermittent
employment" and recommended that this ban be lifted in the construc-
tion and maritime industries.' 7 This recommendation was not then
adopted by the Congress. The pending Kennedy-Ervin Bill would
legalize contracts between building trades unions and builders before
any employees are hired.' 8 A comparable bill introduced in the House
would legalize maritime and building trades hiring halls.19 George
Meany, who rose to the presidency of the AFL-CIO through the
plumbers union, has announced that enactment of this provision is es-
sential.20
A second reason why unions desire closed shop or other forms of
union security agreements is to preserve the principle of exclusive
majority representation during a strike. The National Labor Relations
Act gives exclusive representation rights to the organization which is
the choice of the majority. This is necessary, said a member of the
National Labor Relations Board. "While there may be room for a new
professional society or a new business concern, the same is not true
of employee representatives. Labor representation is more like govern-
ment; there simply is not room for two in the same unit under our
law.
2 1
There are several theoretical alternatives to exclusive majority
representation. There could be two or even more unions operating with-
in the same unit, each representing its own members and no one else.
But if Union A wanted a seniority system based on a plant-wide unit,
and Union B wanted a seniority system based on a departmental basis;
or if Union B wanted a system of promotion based on seniority and
10 Covington, Union Security Elections in the Building and Construction Industry
under the Taft-Hartley Act, 4 IND. & LAB. Rm. Rxv. 541 (1951).
"7 Hearings On Taft-Hartley Act Revisions before the Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 1, at 504-05 (1953).18 S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. Title VI (1959).
1 H.R. 889, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
"0 N.Y. Times, March 3, 1959, p. 18, col. 1.
" Rodgers, Bakers' Unions: A Study In Schism, A Result: Union Division,
45 VA. L. REv. 207-08 (1959).
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Union C wanted the promotion system based on something else, collec-
tive bargaining would break down rapidly. There is the further
theoretical possibility of proportional representation-each union with-
in the plant being represented on a joint council on a pro rata basis,
with the joint council ironing out differences between the unions and
dealing with the employer. This possibility was actually contemplated
in the auto industry during the early NRA days, but rejected. The plan
of setting up "workers councils," said the New York Times, was im-
practicable as it "would bring in American Federation of Labor unions,
company unions, rump unions, dissident factions of the A.F. of L., and
even left wing Communist Union." "There is substantial agreement
among both students and practitioners that exclusive majority repre-
sentation is necessary for workable collective bargaining.1
22
Under the principle of exclusive majority representation, any agree-
ment between the union and management is binding upon all within the
unit even though many of the individuals within the unit suffer thereby
23
and even though an individual workman may be capable of getting
better terms than those obtainable by the group.24 However, when no
agreement is reached and a strike is called, this majority decision is
not binding on the individual employee. He may now, if he chooses,
accept individual conditions of employment rejected by the majority.
In so doing he is denying the exclusive representation of the union and
is assuming the right to act as an individual. Yale Professor Chamber-
lain points out that unions seek the closed shop "since they are thereby
provided with disciplinary powers over those employees whose economic
exigency or lack of sympathy might otherwise have led them to 'scab,'
to use the vernacular, breaking the union's strength at its most critical
moment, weakening its bargaining power when it was most in need of
exerting it. With compulsory membership, the employee who ignored
the picket line could later be subjected to fine and even dismissed from
his job for his derogation of group authority. '25 Since right-to-work
laws deprive unions of power to negotiate with employers for contracts
giving them authority to discipline those who break ranks during a
strike, many labor spokesmen have called them "right-to-scab" and
"right-to-wreck" laws.20
A third reason why unions want a dosed or union shop lies in the
2 Chamberlain, The Problem of Union Security, 26 Proceedings of the Academy
of Political Science 5 (1954).
SFord Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
" J. I. Case Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944).
" Chamberlain, supra note 22, at 9.
"8 UNION SHOP AND THE PtmLIC WELFRE, Proceedings of the Second Annual
Industrial Relations Conference, Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO 95
(1958). (Hereinafter cited as AFL-CIO, UNION SHOP AND THE PUBLIC W.L-
PARE.)
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need for self-protection from the anti-union employer. The historic
technique for destroying a union is to fire the most active and popular
union members. This technique is not available to the employer who
signs a closed shop contract permitting the union to designate replace-
ments for discharged employees. This need for self-protection still
exists in many industries and in many areas of the country. A 1952
Senate Report concludes that "there exists in the textile industry, pri-
marily in the South, a widespread conspiracy to prevent union organiza-
tion and to destroy those unions which now exist."27 This Senate Com-
mittee adds that one of the techniques for destroying established unions
is the discharge of union leaders and leading union adherents.
28  Wit-
nesses before the 1957 McClellan Committee investigation of Nathan W.
Shefferman testified that there exist a "legion" of labor-relations firms
selling anti-union services. The principal device to this end is to as-
certain the active unionists and fire them. When Committee Counsel
commented that it was illegal to fire an employee because he was an
active unionist and asked how this was achieved, the following colloquy
took place:
Mr. Binns. Well, one way was, of course, putting them on other
jobs.
Mr. Kennedy. Putting them on undesirable work? And forcing
them to quit that way; is that right?
Mr. Binns. Well, yes.
Mr. Kennedy. How else was it handled to get rid of these people
who were in favor of the union?
Mr. Binns. Well, also in this program, absenteeism and if they
were accident-prone. That was the two main things. We kept a close
check on them.
Mr. Kennedy. You were looking for causes which you could use
against these individuals to get rid of them, is that right?
Mr. Binns. Yes, sir.
29
The closed shop is the only practical method for depriving the
anti-union employer of this weapon. The Taft-Hartley act affords no
real protection. Processing the typical unfair labor practice charge
before the National Labor Relations Board during the first four years of
the Taft-Hartley Act consumed an average period of 27 months from
the filing of charge to the Board decision. This delay, concluded the
"' Labor-Management Relations in the Southern Textile Industry, Report of
the Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management Relations, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.,
Committee Print 54 (1952).
28 Id. at 60.
2 Hearings before the Select Committee of the Senate on Improper Activities
in the Labor or Management Field, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15, at 58 (1957).
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Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, "is such as almost to
destroy completely the effectiveness of administrative action." 80
A fourth reason why unions and union members want union security
agreements is to eliminate the so-called "free rider." The problem of
the "free rider" comes about in this way. The union organized shop
generally pays better wages than does its non-union competitor.81
"Numerous studies made by the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicate that,
within industries, earnings are usually but not uniformly higher in
establishments having collective bargaining agreements. '8 2  Also, the
employee in the organized shop enjoys better and safer working condi-
tions and he has far more job security than does the employee in the
nearby competing non-organized shop. A recent study of 500 union and
non-union plants in eleven southeastern states shows that the union
plant has greater fringe benefits in the form of pension plans,
insurance plans, credit unions, and lunch rooms; that the union
plant takes more precaution in the employment of its workers; that it
insists upon compliance with safety precautions; and that the union
plant is much more apt than a non-union competitor to have a promotion
and lay-off system based on seniority and to have procedures with
established steps to permit employees to air grievances. 88 Achieving
and maintaining these benefits costs money which comes from union
dues. But these benefits are available to each and every employee,
whether or not he pays union dues, as the union is required by law to
represent non-members "without hostile discrimination, fairly, im-
partially, and in good faith," 34 and without charge. 5 Consequently, in
the absence of a union shop agreement, there are employees who refuse
to join the union and yet enjoy the benefits of working in an organized
plant. These employees, called "free riders" or "free loaders," naturally
are resented by the dues-paying union members and this resentment fer-
ments a demand for an agreement requiring all employees to pay for the
benefits they receive.
When President Walter Reuther of the United Auto Workers was
asked by Senator Mundt why his union favored union shop agreements,
he replied:
"Labor-Management Relations in the Southern Textile Industry, op. cit.
supra note 27, at 63.
"I The employee in the southern textile plant with a union contract receives
approximately 5 cents an hour more than the employee in the plant with no union
contract. Id. at 52.
" Lewis, Wage Dispersion in Manufacturing Industries, 1950-55, 79 MONTHLY
LABOR Rmvimv 780, 784 (1956).
"3 Steele, Myles, and McIntyre, Unionism and Personnel Practices in the South-
east, 8 ID. & LAB. REL. Ray. 253 (1955).
"Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944).
" The National Labor Relations Board announced that it would "decertify"
any union which charged non-union employees for services which it provided union
members free of charge. Hughes Tool Company, 104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1953).
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The pressure is from the membership. I have seen situations
where the fellow says, "We would rather have the union shop to
make this handful of free riders pay their fare than we would like
a wage increase." When you talk about the labor bosses doing
these things, you are just kidding yourself. The pressure is from
the rank and file, the guys who are paying their fare want every-
body to pay their fare.36
The results of federal and state elections requiring member consent to
the union shop contract bear this out. All but a handful of participating
employees voted to authorize their union to negotiate union shop agree-
ments.3 7 In the first year of voting under the Taft-Hartley Act-Ap-
proximately 2,000,000 employees were concerned-98% of the elections
resulted in favor of the union shop agreement, and only 4% of the em-
ployees voted against the union shop. 8s A New Hampshire law re-
quiring a vote by employees prior to the negotiation of a union shop
agreement brought similar results.3 9
The resentment by dues-paying union members, usually steady
workers who have achieved skill, social recognition, and interest in their
job conditions, is due in large part to the fact that the "free rider" is
usually a drifter or floater. 40 Although the rate of labor turnover is
high, it is caused by the activities of a minority of the labor force.
A survey of tool and die makers, for example, shows that sixty per cent
of the job changing was done by fourteen per cent of the workers.41
Another type of "floater" is the farmer who seeks temporary industrial
employment. 42 The permanently employed union members feel that
these temporary employees should pay their share of the costs for
maintaining the conditions whch drew them to the plant with the union
wages and working conditions.
THE TAFT-HARTLEY UNION SHOP
In 1947, following a post World War II wave of strikes, Congress
decided that the pendulum of power had swung too far to the union side.
"6 Hearings Before the Select Committee of the Senate On Improper Activities
In The Labor Or Management Field, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 25 at 10103 (1958).
37 Legal requirement that employees vote to authorize the negotiation of a
union shop contract rests on the assumption that the rank-and-file need legal
protection from union '%osses." The results of these elections invalidate this as-
sumption. Witney, Union-Shop and Strike-Vote Elections: A Legislative Fallacy,
2 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 247 (1949).
39 Hogan, The Meaning of the Union Shop Elections, 2 IND. & LAB. REL. REv.
319 (1949).
"Ibid.
40 Strauss and Sayles, Patterns of Participation in Local Unions, 6 IND. & LAB.
REi REv. 31, 39 (1952).
"' Swerdloff, Worker Mobility In Three Skilled Occupations, 78 MONTHLY
LABOR REvIEw 772 (1955).
"2 Approximately 25% of North Carolina's farmers worked in "off farm"
employment for 100 days or more in 1954. CARBART, THE IMPACT OF STATE AND
LOCAL TAXES IN NORTH CAROLINA AND THE SOUTHEASTERN STATES 52 (1956).
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Addressing itself to the problem of union security, Congress did several
things. First, the closed shop which makes union membership a con-
dition of initial employment was outlawed. Second, the hiring halls
and other provisions offering preferential employment opportunities to
union members were outlawed. Third, union and management were
permitted (but not required) to negotiate for a union shop agreement
requiring employees to join the union within thirty days,43 provided
that a majority of the employees eligible to vote affirmatively authorized
the union to enter such negotiations.44 Fourth, Congress provided that
even if a union shop agreement were signed, the employer could not dis-
charge an employee for failure to join the union if the employee were
denied union membership because of race, religion, sex, political views,4 5
or for any "reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender
the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condi-
tion of acquiring or retaining union membership. ' 46 To close all loopholes
on this later score, Congress made it an unfair labor practice for a labor
union to charge fees or dues "which the Board finds excessive or
discriminatory under all the circumstances.1 47  Fifth, Congress gave
those employees whose union had signed a union shop contract an op-
portunity to "deauthorize" the union shop. If thirty per cent of the
workers in the bargaining unit request an election, the NLRB conducts
one and if a majority votes against the union shop, it will no longer be
a part of the contract.48 In sum, the traditional union security agree-
ment whereby the union can cause the discharge of the labor spy, the
strike breaker, the saboteur, and the wildcat striker is outlawed; and in
its place is substituted the Taft-Hartley union shop (terminable at any
time by majority vote of the employees affected) under which the em-
ployee who tenders his dues cannot be discharged even if he refuses to
join the union, 49 even if he refuses to do picket duty when his union is
on strike, 0 even if he continues to work when his union is on strike,51
"161 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1952).
" This proviso was terminated in 1951 at the request of Senator Taft who
commented that the elections "have almost always resulted in a vote favoring the
union shop." S. Rep. No. 646, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1951).
"Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against
an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable
grounds for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on
the same terms and conditions geneially applicable to other members." 61 STAT.
140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1952).
"Ibid.
,r61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (5), (1952).
'8 The NLRB is required to conduct the "deauthorization" elections even though
the employees petitioning for one are not members of the union and even if the
petition is inspired by the employei or by a rival union. 19 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP.
70-71 (1954). The NLRB annual reports for the years 1952-1955 show that 425
such elections were conducted with the employees voting to end the union shop
in approximately 60% of the cases.
,Union Starch & Refining Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1951).'0 NLRB v. Eclipse Lumber Co., 199 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1952).
" NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1953).
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and even if he uses his official position in the union for the purposes
of wrecking it.52 The only similarity between the traditional union shop
agreement and that which is permitted by the Taft-Hartley Act is that
both require employees who enjoy union-won benefits to pay their pro-
portionate share of the operating costs of the union.
Finally, the Taft-Hartley Act authorized the states, in their discre-
tion, to outlaw the union shop entirely. Section 14(b) provides that
nothing in the act permitting the union shop shall be construed as
authorizing such agreements "in any State or Territory in which such
execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law." 53
Thereafter, the battle over the union shop, and whether it should be
banned by a right-to-work law, raged in forty states with contentions
running a wide gamut.
Do RIGHT-TO-WoRK LAWS ENTICE NEW INDUSTRY?
One of the peripheral arguments advanced in support of right-to-
work laws is that they attract new industry. Proponents of the laws
point out that the eleven states which outlawed the union shop in 1947
have outstripped the national average gains in growth of new industry.
The states of Florida and Texas are cited as illustrative. One Oklahoma
editor argued that Texas and Arkansas are moving ahead in attracting
new industries and that Oklahoma was standing still because "there is no
Oklahoma statute which guarantees that unionism will not strangle in-
dustry; there is no 'right-to-work' law."5 4  In 1953, Governor Byrnes
asked the legislature to outlaw closed and union shop contracts so that
South Carolina could compete with other southern states in attracting
northern industry.55
All studies, however, indicate that right-to-work law states have
not received more than their proportionate share of new industry, and
that the enactment of right-to-work laws is in no way responsible for
their increase in non-farm employment.
Between 1939 and 1943 the national increase in non-agricultural
employment averaged 63 per cent, and the fact that the original eleven
right-to-work states averaged higher is due to the fact that Florida and
11 Kingston Cake Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 1445 (1952). Williams, an official of union
A, urged the members to join rival union B. When a sufficient number did so, a
representation election was held and Williams refused to sign a non-communist
affidavit for the purpose of keeping his union off the ballot and throwing the elec-
tion to union B. When union A finally overcame these handicaps and won
the election, Williams was expelled from the union and discharged under the
union shop contract. The NLRB held'this to be an unfair labor practice and
ordered him reinstated. Williams at all times had tendered his union dues; the
only requirement for retaining employment in a plant with a union shop contract.
"361 STAT. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1952).
" Quoted in NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK COMMITTEE, Do RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
HuRT OR HELP THE ECONOMY? (1952).
" Cox, Federalism in Labor Law, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1297, 1303 (1954).
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Texas ranked in the top five states in terms of increased percentage.
New Mexico ranked first in the nation with a percentage increase of
123 per cent, an increase attributable to the atomic energy installation,
not to the fact that New Mexico refused to enact a right-to-work law.50
Five of the original eleven right-to-work law states (Arkansas, Iowa,
Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota) were below the national
average of percentage increase in non-farm employment. 7 In the South
Atlantic region (consisting of the right-to-work law states of Virginia,
North Carolina, Georgia, and Florida and the two non right-to-work
law states of West Virginia and South Carolina) the percentage
increase in non-farm employment was 43 per cent from 1939 to 1943,
and only 19 per cent from 1943 to 1953 when right-to-work laws were
in operation. In the West North Central region (consisting of 4 original
right-to-work law states and 3 others) the percentage increase prior to
the enactment of right-to-work laws (29 per cent) exceeded the per-
centage increase after the enactment of such laws (23 per cent)ps
A study of the percentage increase in manufacturing employment
in the eleven states in the southeast (five of them original "right-to-
work" law states) demonstrates that the enactment of such laws has
little or no effect on an industrialization program. The growth of
industrialization in this area is not a recent phenomenon. Industrializa-
tion has shown a continuous growth since 1899 with the enactment of
right-to-work laws in 1947 having no noticeable impact. The per-
centage increases for each decade since 1899 are as follows: 1899-1909,
58 per cent; 1909-1919, 21 per cent; 1919-1929, 14 per cent; 1929-1939,
2 per cent; 1939-1949, 39 per cent; 1949-1953, 13 per cent.5 9
Interviews with business concerns which did move south in the
post war years demonstrate that the decision to move southward was not
motivated to any extent by the existence of right-to-work laws or by
a low wage scale economy.60 Industry moved south for three primary
reasons: interest in the southern market, interest in southern materials,
or interest in the availability of southern labor.
Consumer purchasing power increased rapidly in the South during
the war years of 1940-1945, largely due to government military ex-
penditures. Forty-five per cent of the new plants that located in the
South during the post war years were interested in this increased
consumer market. These "market oriented plants" produce such things
as automobiles, farm equipment, electrical supplies, machinery, rubber
"' Wolfbein, Changing Geography of American Itdustry, 77 MONTHLY LABOR
RFviE~W 739 (1954).
57 Ibid.
5 Id. at 743.
Robock, Industrialization and Economic Progress in the Southeast, 20
SOUTHERN EcONOmic JOURNAL 307 (1954).
" MCLAUGHLIN AND RoBocK, WHY INDUSTRY MOVES SOUTH (1949).
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products, and building materials. They build the largest plants, employ
the most people, and pay the highest wages. Ford, General Motors,
General Elertric, Westinghouse, International Harvester, National
Carbon, and others which fall within this category of "market oriented"
plants report that they expected to be unionized and were in fact
unionized. Many of them have company-wide agreements with the
home union whereby wage rates are standardized in all plants, wherever
located. Running away from unions had little to do with the location
of these plants.
Thirty per cent of the plants which came south in the post war years
did so because they were interested in cheap electric power, natural gas,
forest products, and minerals. These "material oriented" plants had
no concern with avoiding unions. The most common reaction of the plant
executives was that they accepted the principle of collective bargaining.
One company selected a union town over an anti-union community be-
cause the company expected the new plant to be organized and did not
want to be caught in a battle between union and anti-union forces.
Twenty-five per cent of the new plants which moved south did so
because of an interest in southern labor. These "labor oriented" plants
do not provide 25 per cent of the new industrial jobs. None of them
employ as many as 1,000 workers, whereas 25 per cent of the "market
oriented" plants employ over this number. Most of these "labor
oriented" plants came south because of the availability of labor, a few
to get cheap labor. The Norge Division of the Borg-Warner plant, for
example, built a new plant in Chattanooga, Tennessee because the labor
supply in the Muskegon, Michigan area, where the company's original
plant is located, was inadequate to meet the requirements of the pro-
posed expansion. The Chattanooga plant is organized by the same
union that bargains for the Muskegon workers; and the company said
that unionization played no part in its locational decision. Similarly,
The Monroe Calculating Machine Company (of East Orange, New
Jersey) and a Rockford, Illinois automotive parts company built new
plants in the South because of a shortage of labor at home. Neither of
these companies moved to avoid a high union wage scale, but to assure
themselves of an adequate supply of labor.
There are some companies, however, which moved south to avoid
labor unions. These companies are largely in the apparel, shoe, and
textile industries. Just what percentage of new jobs are created by the
arrival of this type of concern is unknown. However, this type of in-
dustry, the type that goes south to avoid union wages, does not increase
the economic welfare of the state where it settles. It exploits rather
than develops the economy, and thereby makes the region less attractive
1959]
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to that industry which is "market oriented." A 1956 study of economic
conditions in North Carolina clearly demonstrates this fact.61
North Carolina is far more dependent for its income on industrial
wages than on farm profits. In terms of personal income payments,
the largest contributions to the total are made by manufacturing enter-
prises (25 per cent of state income), the second largest are made in the
forms of government wages and disbursements (18 per cent), the third
largest source of income comes from trade and service (16 per cent),
and the fourth largest is farm income (13 per cent),62 North Carolina
progressively becomes an industrialized state. According to the 1955
Census of Agriculture, 42 per cent of the farm operators in North
Carolina are employed in off-farm work, 46 per cent of the income re-
ceived by farm families is received by persons whose major occupation
was in non-agricultural work, and from 1940 to 1950 there was a net
migration from North Carolina farms of over half a million, whereas the
net migration from the state was only half this amount. 63
In spite of growing industrialization, North Carolina is still a poor
state. It ranks forty-third in the nation in such things as family income,
per cent of infants delivered by physicians in hospitals, per cent of homes
with running water and electric lights, and per cent of persons twenty-
five years of age or more who have completed five or more grades of
school. 64
North Carolina's low economic standing cannot be explained by the
fact that there are no manufacturing jobs. It is explained by the fact
that the enterprises which comprise the North Carolina industrial
family (textile mill products manufacturers employ 22 per cent of all
non-agricultural employees in North Carolina; lumber, 3.7 per cent;
furniture, 3.4 per cent; tobacco 3.4 per cent; apparel, 2.2 per cent; and
food products, 2.1 per cent) are those which are low-wage industries.
In 1953, the average weekly earnings in all manufacturing industries for
the 'United States as a whole was $79.52 whereas the average weekly
earnings in the industries which provide the bulk of North Carolina
industrial jobs was considerably lower.65 There is nothing desirable
about industrialization per se. Industrialization, accompanied by low
wages, is the cause, not the cure, for economic problems.
In sum, there is no evidence that industry as a whole is concerned
with "right-to-work" laws when selecting a location for expansion.
Of the ten states which led in the percentage of increased industrializa-
tion from 1939 to 1953, only two of them (Texas and Florida) were
right-to-work states. Those industries which are either "market" or
11 CARBERT, THE IMPAcT OF STATE AND LocAL TAXES IN NORTH CAROLINA
AND THE SOUTHEASTERN STATES (1956). .a
62 Id. at 54. Id. at 52.6' Id. at 48. 61 Id. at 57-58.
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"supply" oriented, the industries which create the largest number of
jobs and pay the highest wages, prefer a high-wage to a low-wage area.
It is only those industries such as apparel, shoe, and textile which con-
cern themselves with a right-to-work law, and these are the industries
which create rather than solve problems. As concluded by Mr. Carbert,
if a low wage scale is the only enticement which the Southeastern states
have to offer new industry, "they might as well be reconciled to a status
of permanent economic colonialism. The use of low-wage Southern
labor to produce products for sale in a national market represents an
exploitation that is just as destructive as an irresponsible mining of
natural resources .... Such exploitation takes the form of extracting
the energies of the state without replacement and without proper com-
pensation."
6 6
Do RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS CURTAIL STRIKES AND
CREATE INDUSTRIAL PEACE?
Proponents of right-to-work laws often contend that they are de-
sirable because they reduce the number of strikes. For example, Ray A.
Nelson, Assistant Attorney General of Nebraska told a Senate Labor
Committee that:
We have avoided strikes caused by the unions attempting to
enforce a closed shop contract. That has been one of the biggest
elements of strikes. It (the Nebraska right-to-work law) out-
laws all forms of union security. So we have had the experience
of having comparatively less strikes since the adoption of our
amendment.
6 7
A glance at chart number one showing the number of man days
idle due to work stoppages in each state shows that in most of the
original eleven right-to-work law states there were more working days
lost by strikes in 1947 than in most of the following years. 68 These
statistics are misleading if used to prove that right-to-work laws curtail
strikes. The year 1947 is not a proper base period because "strike idle-
ness in 1947 was far less than in the record years of 1946 and 1945, but
it was greater than in any of the other years since 1919." 6 9 A more
realistic measure of the impact of right-to-work laws on strike incidence
is the percentage of the nation's strikes taking place within right-to-work
law states as compared to these taking place in the nation as a whole.
Chart number two demonstrates that the enactment of right-to-work
00 Id. at 50.
17 Hearings on Taft-Hartley Act Revisions before the Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 at 877 (1953).
" The statistics are compiled from the May issues of the MONTHLY LAmOR
Raviw.
" Crowther and Herlichy, Work Stoppages During 1947, 66 MONTHLY LABOR
IZEvmw 479 (1948). o
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laws did not curtail the number of strikes in the eleven original right-to-
work law states. Nebraska, whose spokesman told the Senate that its
right-to-work law decreased strikes, was the scene of twice as many
of the nation's strikes in the years following the right-to-work law than
in the years preceding its enactment. In eight of the eleven original
right-to-work law states (Arizona, Georgia, Iowa, Nebraska, North
Dakota, South Dakota and Texas) the percentage of the nation's strikes
have increased since 1947. For the seven year period prior to 1947,
the combined eleven right-to-work law states had an annual average
of 3.55 per cent of the nation's strikes; in the seven year period following
1947, the percentage increased to 4.51 per cent.
This increase within the right-to-work law states of the percentage
of the nation's strikes is not due to an increase in industrialization or by
an increase in the proportion of employees within a state engaged in
manufacturing. The growth of manufacturing in the Southeast, for
example, was less than the growth in manufacturing in the entire nation.
From 1939 to 1952, manufacturing expanded in the Southeast by 54 per
cent; during the same period it expanded in the entire nation by 61
per cent. During the 1950-1952 period of the Korean conflict, industrial
expansion in the Southeast fell behind that of the nation as a whole, yet
the percentage of strikes within the Southeast increased.
70
The fact that right-to-work laws have failed to curtail strikes is not
surprising. The premise' of those who claim that a right-to-work law
will curtail strikes is that strikes are caused by union demands for a
"union shop" and that consequently, when a union shop is made illegal,
a primary cause for strikes is removed. This premise, however, is not
true. As the Department of Labor tells us, most strikes are caused by
disputes over rates of pay and day-to-day working conditions. Strikes
for a closed or union shop are responsible for only 7 per cent of the
man-days idle due to work stoppages.71
Right-to-work laws have not only failed to prevent work stoppages
they have the detrimental effect of depriving the employer of what he
wants most from a union-a firm "no-strike" pledge for the duration of
the collective bargaining agreement. Studies by the Department of
Labor,72 by the Labor Relations Law section of the American Bar
Association.73 and by University of Florida Professor Luck7 4 all agree
that employers want unions to sign no-strike agreements and that many
10 Robock, Manufacturing Production Workers in Southeastern States: 1939-
1952, 20 SOUTHERN EcoNomIc JOURNAL 307, 311 (1954)." Crowther and Herlichy, supra note 69 at 485.
"Wolk and Nix, Work Stoppage Provisions in Union Agreements, 74
MONTHLY LABOR REVIEw 272 (1952).
The No-Strike Clause, 21 GRO. WASH. L. REv. 127 (1952).
4Effects of the Taft-Hartley Act on Labor Agreements, 1947-1952, 20 SouTm-
ERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL 145 (1954).
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unions refuse to sign such agreements in the absence of a closed shop
contract unless they are excused from liability for the acts of those over
whom they have no control. Unions feel that if they have no power to
punish malcontents and others who lead "wildcat" strikes, they should
not assume responsibility for ensuring there will be no such strikes.
They insist upon exculpatory clauses excusing them from responsibility
for damage because of unauthorized strikes or work stoppages. In
1946, prior to the Taft-Hartley Act and right-to-work laws, only 13
per cent of union contracts contained these "exculpatory clauses." By
1952, the percentage had grown to 50 per cent. These "exculpatory
clauses" are far more prevalent in the right-to-work law states than in
those states permitting the union shop. For example, in the Denver Col-
orado area, where the right-to-work law was rejected, more than 80
per cent of the no-strike clauses are unconditional-the union assumes
responsibility for wildcat strikes.75 In the tobacco industry, however,
largely centralized in the right-to-work law states of North Carolina
and Virginia, 50 per cent of the collective bargaining contracts contain
exculpatory clauses.
76
Not only does the right-to-work law deprive the employer of equal
opportunity to obtain an unconditional no-strike agreement from the
union, it also deprives him of a technique for eliminating labor unrest.
Employee morale, loyalty and productivity increase when the employer
signs a union shop agreement. This has been attested by field surveys,
77
by the remarks and testimony of many individual businessmen, 78 and by
surveys of businessmen by organizations with no union connections.
Business Week, for example, interviewed fifty businessmen from Boston
to San Diego and reported that "Employers who have had it (union
security agreements) longest find the most advantages in it.... [Fifty-
eight per cent] declare the net effect on management of the elimination
of such security would be bad."179 Some of the reasons employers gave
Business Week for favoring union security are that:
It seems to give the union an incentive to settle disputes
quickly rather than drag them along for purposes of recruiting
new members.
It has centralized control over employee relations, because we
are able now to deal with all our employees as a unit.
71 The No-Strike Clause, supra note 73, at 153." Wolk and Nix, supra note 72, at 274.
'7 Dean, Unionr Activity and Dual Loyalty, 7 IND. & LABa. REL. REv. 526 (1954);
PuRcELL , THE Woma SPEAs His MIND ON COMPANY AND UNION 18 (1953);
ROSE, UNION SOLIDARITY 189 (1952).
1 Patrick McDonough, an Oakland California manufacturer, typically re-
marked: "When I recognize the union representing my workers and I agree to
give it security through a closed shop contract, I get the men to work with me,
instead of against me." Quoted in 37 AFL Weekly News Service No. 21 (1947).
"' Business Week, March 8, 1957, p. 85.
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Whenever there is trouble in the plant or some question arises,
we know whom we can hold responsible.
An investigation by the National Industrial Conference Board
showed that employers with practical experience of dealing with unions
under union security agreements preferred a union shop because it:
Places the union in a better position to keep its agreement;
eliminates coercion of employees; gives the employer the help of
the international officers, if necessary; gives employees greater
feeling of responsibility and interest in their jobs because they
feel they have something to say about their conditions of work;
makes it possible to hold the union responsible for the actions of
its members, while with the open shop it cannot be held responsi-
ble.
8 0
A report of the National Planning Association points out that:
In all of the cases studied, the employers saw positive ad-
vantages in bargaining with a strong and well-disciplined union,
and were convinced that they should take steps, directly or indi-
rectly, to encourage workers to join and support the organization
which represented them.8 '
With the strength of a union security agreement behind it, a union
can make constructive concessions helpful to management even though
these concessions may be detrimental to the short run interests of some
union members.82 Without this security, unions must press for de-
mands desired by the members even when the results may be of over-all
detriment to the company and union.8 3 One authority, Harvard Pro-
fessor Slichter, concludes that: "An assured status for the union is not a
guarantee of successful union-employer relations but it is a prerequisite,
and the closed shop or its equivalent is the only way of assuring the
status of the union."8
s
ARE RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS NECESSARY To PROTECT EMPLOYEES
FROM EXCESSIVE AND EXCLUSIONARY UNION INITIATION FEES
AND MONTHLY DUES?
Union security arrangements require the employee to pay union
initiation fees and dues in order to either obtain or retain employment.
8 National Industrial Conference Board, The Closed Shop, in STUDIES IN
PERSONNEL POLICY 6 (1939)." CAUSES OF INDUSTRIAL PEACE UNDER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING-FUNDA-
MENTAL OF LABOR PEACE 74 (1953).
82 The personnel manager of the New York Herald Tribune commented that
it was the existence of a union security agreement that made it psychologically
possible for the Newspaper Guild to punish its members for absenteeism. Herrick,
Pros and Cons of the Closed-Shop Issue, 26 ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 20,
24 (1954).
8 A Texas labor leader points out that under the right-to-work law his union
must take many more grievance cases, often trivial ones, to arbitration lest the
union members withdraw from the local or grounds that they are not being ably
represented. Time, Nov. 24, 1958, p. 88.
"4 SLICHTER, UNION POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT 95 (1941).
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It has been vigorously contended that right-to-work laws (which outlaw
union security agreements) are necessary because unions set excessive
initiation fees and dues which have the effect of depriving many would-
be employees without much money from employment where union
security agreements exist. This argument in favor of right-to-work
laws is unsound for at least three reasons.
First, the employee is already protected by that provision of the
Taft-Hartley Act which makes it a union unfair labor practice to re-
quire employees to pay fees or dues which the Labor Board "finds
excessive or discriminatory under all the circumstances." 8 5 Second, as-
suming that the Labor Board is not doing its job, a simple state law
prohibiting excessive union fees and dues would protect the employee
without at the same time penalizing all unions, regardless of all other
factors. This is the pattern set by New Hampshire where state law
sets a maximum limit on initiation fees of twenty-five dollars.86 Third,
union fees and dues are not excessive.
Monthly dues are not set at a high level to keep workers from
joining the union for a very good reason-those already members of
the union would have to pay the same high amount. Initiation fees are
not subject to this limitation and there are many in the rank-and-file
who feel that the Johnny-Come-Lately should pay a high initiation fee
and thus bear some of the costs of raising the wage and working
standards in the industry. Union officers, however, resist high initia-
tion fees as they tend to prevent eligible workers from joining the union.
Union leaders know that their effectiveness is diminished in proportion
to the number of non-union employees available to the employer. The
issue of excessive union fees and dues, however, is not one of theoretical
argument. It can be and has been reduced to dollars and cents.
A study of 194 unions with a declared membership of 17,513,514
reveals that 179 of these unions (membership of 17,302,283) have con-
stitutional provisions covering the amount that can be charged by way
of an initiation fee. Thirty-six of them specify a single fee, the most
frequent being $5.00. Eighty-two of them have constitutions that
permit the local to determine the fee within certain limits. Five dollars
is the most frequent minimum initiation fee, $10.00 is the most
frequent maximum. 7 The others set either a minimum or a maximum,
and leave the exact amount up to the locals.
A study of the initiation fees charged by. locals of unions formerly
belonging to the CIO revealed that only one of them charged more than
" Section 8(b) (5), 49 STAT. 452 (1947); 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (5) (1952).
88 Hogan, The Meaning of the Union Shop Elections, 2 IND. & LA. RE. REv.
319, 328 (1949).
T NAiONAL IxDusTmAL CONFERENCE BOARD, HANDBOOK OF UNION GovERN-
MENT STRUCTURE AND PRocEDuREs 33 (1955) (hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK OF
UNIoN Govru-u.MENT).
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$25.00. This was the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association with
a membership of 11,000. The constitution of the automobile workers'
union (membership declared at 1,200,000) permitted initiation fees
between $2.00 and $15.00. The rubber workers' union (200,000) made
a fiat charge of $2.00 and the steel workers' union (membership at
1,000,000) permitted its locals to charge a maximum of $3.00. Most of
the unions formerly belonging to the CIO had a minimum, rather than
a maximum, initiation fee, and this was generally set at $2.00. Most
locals charged the $2.00 minimum. 8
Of particular interest to the southeastern states is the following list
of initiation fees charged by 61 locals of 5 unions in the garment and tex-
tile industry.
Fees up to and Garment Textile Textile Total
including Workers Glove Hosiery AFL CI0 Sample
$ 2.50 5 4 1 13 5 28
$5.00 5 1 4 4 5 19
$7.50 - 1 4 2 3 10
$10.00 - - - - - 0
$12.50 1 - 1 - - 2
$25.00 - - 1 - - 1
$50.00 - - 1 - - 1
Of the 61 local unions, 57 charged initiation fees of $7.50 or less, and
almost half of them charged initiation fees of $2.50 or less.8 9
The unions in the garment and textile industries are on the average
among those which have the lowest initiation fees. Unions having the
highest initiation fees are those in the building and construction trade
industries. Initiation fees are high in part because many locals of these
unions provide mortuary, sickness, old age, and unemployment benefits.
For example, members of the electricians union can draw pensions of
$40.00 per month, and one-third of the payment to the Interna-
tional Union of Operating Engineers is set aside in the Death Benefit
Fund. Seventy-two per cent of the current income in the Carpenters
Union is paid out in direct benefits-pension and death benefits-to the
members.9 0 Initiation fees charged by locals that operate without these
benefits are uniformly lower than in the locals which provide them. 1
The initiation fees charged by 297 locals in 13 international unions in
the building and construction industry run a wide gamut. Of the 297
"Taft, Dues and Initiation Fees It Labor Unions, 60 QUARTERLY JOURNAL
Ecoxomics 219 (1945)."TTAFT, THE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT OF LABOR UNIONs 93 (1954).
9Id. at 68-69.
1 Summers, Admission Policies of Labor Unions, 61 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF
EcoNoMics 62, 92 (1946).
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locals, 31 of them (or 10.4 per cent) have initiation fees of under
$12.50. Seventy-two locals (24 per cent) charge less than $37.50.
The largest concentration-79 locals-is in the $89.50-$112.50 group;
and 48 locals charge more. Seventeen locals charge over $200.00 (plumb-
ers' and sheet-metal workers' unions), and 2 plumbers' local unions
charged as much as $312.50.92 Other unions with high initiation fees are
the Actors Equity, AFL (declared membership, 6,695)-$100; the
Boilermakers, AFL (declared membership of 150,000)-$100 maxi-
mum; the Elevator Constructors, AFL (dedlared membership of
10,000)-$200; the American Radio Association, CIO (declared mem-
bership of 2,000)-$100; Stage Employees, AFL (declared member-
ship of 42,000)-not more than 4 times weekly scale of local union;
and the Air Line Pilots, AFL (declared membership of 9,500)-$25 to
$200 according to earnings.93 These are exceptions. "Taking the trade
union movement as a whole, initiation fees can be described as modest
and reasonable. In many unions the initiation fee does little more than
cover the costs of enrolling the member of the local and international
books and paying for his dues book and stamps. ' 94 When union initia-
tion fees are contrasted with the average hourly earnings or rates within
the industry, in most unions the initiation fee can be earned in less than
two days' work. "Even in the building trades, only a small fraction
of locals charge initiation fees that would require more than a week of
work." 95
Dues charged union members are uniformly low. Opposition to
raises in union dues exists in almost all unions, and the pleas of officers
for increases, unless a good case for the change is presented, are often
rejected. In eighty labor organizations most workers could earn their
monthly dues by under two hours of work. High dues, where they
exist, like high initiation fees are closely related to beneficiary activities
and, consequently, part of the dues is an insurance premium against
death, illness, or unemployment.9 6
Dues charged by 72 locals of 6 unions in the garment and textile
industry reach $3.00 in only 3 of them. In 49 of the 72 unions, the
dues were $2.00 or less, and in 20 additional locals, the dues were $2.50
or less.
Dues, as initiation fees, are highest in those unions in the building
and construction trade industries. Dues charged by 285 locals in 13
building trades unions are as follows.
97
92 TART, Op. cit. supra note 89, at 86, 89.
" HANDBOOK OF UNION GOVEmMENT 34-41 (1955).
" TAFT, op. cit. .supra note 89, at 88.
5 Ibid.
geId. at 81. 'T Id. at 70.
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Up To And Over
Including $1.00 $1.50$2.00 $2.50$3.00 $3.50$4.00$ 4.50 $5.00 $6.00 $6.00
Asbestos Workers.. 1 1 1
Bricklayers ........ 2 12 13 6 9 4 1 2
Bridge Workers .... 3 4 3 2 1 1 1 2 2
Carpenters ........ 2 4 5 4 9 2
Electrical Workers. 1 4 1 2 4 4 4 4 2
Operating Engineers 9 2 2 4 1 1
Hod Carriers ...... 2 4 13 6 7 1
Lathers ........... 1 1 1 1
Marble Workers... 1 2 3 1 1 1
Painters and
Paperhangers... 3 1 4 1 1 1 1
Plasterers ......... 2 1 1 2 1 3 7 3 2
Plumbers ......... 17 1 9 2 6 1 10 3 9
Roofers ........... 2 2
Total ....... 9 20 56 32 49 19 28 16 21 15 19
Over two-thirds of the dues charged by these high-dues unions were
under $4.00 per month. Only 19 of the 285 locals (9 of them in the
plumbers union) charged more than $6.00 per month. Only one local
(a member of the Asbestos Workers Union) charged as high as $10.00
per month. Clearly, right-to-work laws are not necessary to protect the
employee from exclusionary union dues.
ARE RIGHT-To-WoRK LAWS NECESSARY To PROTECT EMPLOYEES
FROM EXCLUSIONARY UNION ADMISSION PRACTICES?
As it is claimed that right-to-work laws are necessary to protect the
employee from excessive union fees and dues, it is also claimed that the
closed and union shop provisions should be outlawed because unions
practice arbitrary admission policies. It is argued that unions close
their membership to qualified job seekers, and that this bars them from
employment opportunities where the union shop exists.
There is no question but that some unions discriminate in their
admission policies. For example, constitutions of 56 unions with a
combined membership of 6,190,044 specifically state that no Communist
or other subversive is to be admitted to membership.98 Five unions
with a declared membership of 442,197 have provisions in their constitu-
tions which prohibit the admission of Negroes and other racial minori-
ties.99 On the other side of the ledger, 39 unions with a combined
membership of 4,320,551 have constitutional provisions declaring that
all persons qualified for membership are to be admitted regardless of
their race, or color.'00 The constitutions of 149 unions have no pro-
9 HANDBOOK OF UNION GOVERNUENT 61 (1955).
9 Id. at 63. The unions are the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, Postal Transport Association,
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, and the Brotherhood of Railway Conductors.100Id. at 64.
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visions either way, but at least 11 of them, with a combined membership
of 209,900, were known in 1948 to bar Negroes from membership.10 '
The AFL-CIO constitution makes clear its purpose "to encourage all
workers without regard to race, creed, color, national origin or ancestry
to share equally in the full benefits of union organization" and there is
undoubtedly a large decline in the number of unions that exclude from
membership because of race or color.
102
Citizenship and sex are also criteria for membership in some few
unions. Seven small unions'0 3 exclude aliens from membership and 22
additional unions require that the worker must have filed a declaration
of intent to become a citizen. Eight unions (mostly in the railroad
industry) exclude women from membership, and two unions have consti-
tutional restrictions on admission because of creed.10 4 Forty-six unions,
including most of those formerly in the CIO, protect against exclusion
because of creed.10 5
There is no doubt but that these restrictive union admission policies
when coupled with a union shop agreement might well bar otherwise
qualified workers from employment opportunities. The answer to this
problem, however, does not lie in enactment of a right-to-work law, for
this punishes the unions which condemn as well as the unions which con-
done discriminatory admission practices. The answer to this problem
given by Congress in both the Railway Labor'0 6 and the Taft-Hartley
Acts'0 7 is to permit the union shop but to prohibit the discharge of
those non-union members to whom membership was not available "on
the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members."
The answer given by the state of New York is to make it a crime for any
labor union to deny a person membership "by reason of his race, color
or creed."' 08  The evil of discriminatory union admission policies lies
in the existence of the closed union, not in the existence of the closed
"I Airline Pilots (2,700), Asbestos Workers (4,000), Flint Glass Workers
(25,600), Granite Cutters (4,000), Masters, Mates, and Pilots (3,000), Plumbers
(130,000), Seafarers (30,000), Wire Weavers (400), Marine Firemen (3,000),
Railroad Yardmasters (3,500), and Train Dispatchers (3,500). Summers, Admis-
sion Policies of Labor Unions, 61 QUARTERLY JoURNAL OF EcoNomics 66, 92 (1946).
102 Rauh, Civil Rights and Liberties and Labor Unions, 8 LAB. L.J. 874, 877
(1957).
10I Bookbinders, Broom and Whisk Makers, Glass Workers, Glove Workers,
Marine Engineers, United Licensed Officers, and the Welders. Summers, vtpra
note 101, at 92.
1 The Masters, Mates, and Pilots union requires a member to be a "firm be-
liever in God, the Creator of the Universe," and the Railway Car men exclude
a worker from membership unless he "believes in the existence of a Supreme
Being." There is no evidence that the two unions make any attempt to enforce
these provisions. Ibid.
105 Ibid.
.00 Section 2(11), 64 STAT. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 154(11) (1952).
' Section 8(a) (3), 49 STAT. 452 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1952).
108 N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 43. The constitutionality of this statute was
sustained in Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
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or union shop. It seems better policy to eliminate the former and leave
the latter intact.
ARE RIGHT-To-WORK LAws NECESSARY To PROTECT EMPLOYEES
FRom DISCRIMINATORY EXPULSION POLICIES?
In like vein, it is also argued that right-to-work laws are necessary
because unions expel their members for arbitrary reasons, thereby de-
priving them of employment opportunities where the union shop contract
is in effect. The case of Cecil B. DeMille, expelled from the American
Federation of Radio Artists for refusal to pay a one dollar assessment
to fight the California right-to-work proposal, is often referred to in
this connection.
Right-to-work laws, however, do not seem justified on this score.
First of all, the Taft-Hartley Act now prohibits an employer from
discharging an employee expelled from his union so long as the employee
continues to tender union dues. 0 9 Cecil B. DeMille could not now be
denied employment opportunities if expelled from his union, no matter
how unfraternal his actions. More importantly, and all apart from the
protection afforded by the Taft-Hartley Act, very few persons are ex-
pelled from unions; those persons who are expelled generally deserve
to be expelled; and the courts prohibit unions from expelling those
members who should not be expelled.
Since the union's effectiveness is based largely on the degree to which
it controls the available labor, expulsions tend to weaken the union and
very few members are in fact expelled. Expulsions, without a very good
cause, don't make sense. If members are expelled in large numbers,
they become a threat to union standards. Even more likely, they will
be driven into the arms of a rival union. In the words of President
Burke of the Pulp Workers: "Our union is not interested in expelling
members. We are spending thousands of dollars every year in organiz-
ing new members."" 0
A survey of forty-three international unions shows that expulsions
are "very rare," "few and far between," or "almost negligible." The
replies of ten of these unions (identified only by size of membership)
are given below."'
Size of Union Number of Ezpulsions
1. 10,000 Average 4 a year
2. 40,000 In a normal year, 10 expulsions would be
high
3. 70,000 25 members expelled a year for theft,
intoxication, or dual unionism
109 See text at note 49 supra.
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4. 70,000 1945, three expulsions; 1946, two; 1947,
twenty-in every case due to returning to
work in shops still on strike.
5. 150,000 An average of five or ten a year
6. 250,000 Average of less than ten annually
7. 250,000 Average of less than ten annually
8. 250,000 Eleven appeals in 1947
9. 250,000 Ten expulsions in the last ten years
10. 500,000 Three appeals a month to the general
office.
Union discipline is not imposed arbitrarily. The constitutions of
194 unions require that the member be given charges, trial before the
local union, and opportunity to appear at all hearings, to testify, and
present evidence in his own defense.112 Charges generally involve serious
matters, and the trials are fair.
Thirty charges against members of the National Maritime Union
were:
Fighting aboard ship ..................................... 2
Leaving ship shorthanded ................................ 8
Misconduct aboard ship .................................. 1
Discriminating against a Negro member .................... 2
Refusing to stand watches ................................ 1
Drunkenness aboard ship ................................. 4
Refusal to obey orders ................................... 1
Refusal to attend ship meeting ............................ 1
Failure to complete assignment aboard ship ................. 1
Refusal by head of department to meet with regularly elected
grievance committee ................................... 2
Failure to prepare required meals .......................... 1
Bringing false charges .................................... 1
Charging patrolman with back door shipping ............... 1
Attacking physically a member aboard ship ................. 3
Threatening to kill a member aboard ship .................. 1
One member quit when he received the charges; the other 29 mem-
bers had trials before trial committees who were elected by the member-
ship in the particular port where the ship paid off. Of the 29 cases,
18 were found guilty and 11 not guilty of the offenses charged. Of the
18 found guilty, one member was put on probation for one year, another
member put on probation for six months, and the others fined an average
amount of below fifty dollars. The large number of acquittals indicates
that these trials are not kangaroo proceedings. 113
But the matter does not end with the verdict of the trial committee.
A convicted member is given a right under almost all union constitutions
to appeal the verdict upward through superior organs.114 The first ap-
peal is to the national office which often reverses or modifies the lower
decision. A year's statistics in a few of the larger unions are as
follows." 5
I" HANDBOOK OF UNION GOVERNMENT 65...3 TAFT, op. cit. supra note 89, at 172-173.
11 HANDBOOK OF UNION GOVERNMENT 65.
125 TAFT, op. cit. supra note 89, at 138, 144, 163, 167, 177.
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DECISIONS
Union Total
Appeals Upheld Reversed Modified
United Auto Workers, CIO ............ 25 17 8 0
Carpenters ........................ 39 21 11 7
Ladies Garment Workers..............29 14 4 11
Machinists .......................... 26 14 5 7
Plumbers ............................ 129 63 66 0
Total ..................... 248 129 94 25
Thus, almost half the appeals were successful, at least in part.
In the event the member loses his appeal at the national office level,
in 180 unions he can argue his case before the national convention. 1 0
This is not a cut and dried matter. At the 1945 National Maritime
Union convention, 30 members appealed from union expulsion of whom
16 were successful. The unsuccessful appellants had been charged with
such misdeeds as stealing the ship's treasury funds, fighting with a
dangerous weapon, gambling aboard ship with crooked dice, using
abusive language before passengers, and smuggling narcotics into the
United States.11  A member's rights to appeal do not end at the union's
convention. In at least two unions there is a further right to appeal to
a Public Review Board composed of outstanding citizens who have no
other union connection.""" In all cases the expelled union member can
take his case to courts. "Judicial. remedies are quite complete. Upon
finding that a member has been improperly expelled, the court will order
reinstatement which automatically entitles him to receive insurance
benefits and to work under a union security clause, as well as to partici-
pate fully in union activities.""' 9 The courts can also award damages
for 'mental suffering, humiliation and distress" resulting from union
expulsion in violation of the union's constitution and by-laws.
120
A study of the confidential records in eight unions results in the
conclusions that disciplinary penalties "are seldom severe or unwar-
ranted," that the appellate machinery "offers real protection," and that
union "disciplinary machinery functions, on the whole, justly and
effectively."' 21 In view of these conclusions and the existing protection
afforded by the Taft-Hartley Act and the courts, enactment of a right-
to-work law is wholly unnecessary to protect the employment opportuni-
ties of the union member who might unjustly be expelled from his union.
"" HANDBOOK OF UNION GOVERNMENT 70.
"'7 TArT, op. cit. supra note 89, at 175.
118 Raub, supra note 102, at 880.
119 Summers, Legal Limitations On Union Discipline, 64 HARv. L. REV. 1049,
1093 (1951).
International Ass'n Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
STAF'r, op. cit. supra note 89, at 180 (1954).
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ARE RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS NECESSARY To PROTECT EMPLOYEES
FROM COMMUNISTS AND GANGSTERS?
Mr. Fred Gurley, President of the Atchison, Topeka and Sante Fe
Railway System told an audience that right-to-work laws are necessary
to protect employees from union leaders they dislike: "It is bad enough
to force a man into a good union" remarked Mr. Gurley, "but what about
forcing fine American citizens into a union dominated by Communists,
or one dominated by racketeers? That is being done in this country
today. Theoretically the dissatisfied member has his remedy by the
election of a new slate of officers or even by voting for a change in the
collective bargaining agency. Actually these remedies are not often
invoked because they are enormously difficult to use.'
122
Out of the 194 national unions operating through more than 75,000
locals, there are undoubtedly some that contain communist or gangster
leadership.123 However, the dissatisfied union member has ample op-
portunity to oust the leadership he dislikes, and has exercised this
opportunity on numerous occasions.
First, under the so-called "schism" doctrine, locals in large number
vote themselves out of a communist or racketeering dominated parent
organization. 2 4 In 1949, the CIO expelled the United Electrical
Workers Union on charges of communist domination. At that time the
union was one of the most powerful in the CIO. Today, as a result of
local union disaffiliation under the schism doctrine, it is "almost com-
pletely wiped out," "a union in name only."' 25  Similarly, in 1957, the
AFL-CIO expelled the Bakery and Confectionery Union because of
corruption, and within one year a newly organized union (The American
Bakery and Confectionery Workers Union) won more than half of the
members of the expelled union.
2 8
122 Gurley, Unalienable Rights vs. Union Shop, 26 Proceedings of the Academy
of Political Science 58, 67-69 (1954)."' The average local union official is a married man 44 years of age with two
children. He is a white Protestant, born in the United States, descended from
northern European ancestors. He is interested in and takes an active part in
community affairs and holds an elected office in a fraternal, religious, and/or
veterans' organization. He continues to hold his regular job while he serves as
a local union officer, a position which pays him less than $25.00 a month. He
accepts the responsibility of the local union office because of the opportunity to
improve the working conditions of co-employees. Miller and Stockton, Local
Union Offlcer-His Background, Activities and Attitudes, 8 LAB. L.J. 28 (1957).
Such is the composite picture of the local union officer in a representative com-
munity-honest, sincere, dedicated to the welfare of the union, its members and
his community.
... The schism doctrine, which permits a local union during the term of a
bargaining agreement to disaffiliate from its parent organization without losing
its collective bargaining status, is applicable following a policy conflict within the
parent organization which has a detrimental effect on the stability of bargaining
relations. Rodgers, A Study In Schism, A Result: Union Division, 45 VA. L. REv.
207, 210 (1959).
125 AFL-CIO, UNxIoN SHOP AND THE PuBLic WELFARE 69 (1958).
12. Kennedy, Bakers' Union: A Study In Schism, .The Problem: Corruption,
45 VA. L. REv. 203, 205 (1959).
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Other evidence belies Mr. Gurley's statement that the dissatisfied
union member has only a "theoretical" remedy when represented by a
union he dislikes. The union member can change his affiliation upon
expiration of the company-union contract. In a single brief two year
period shortly preceding Mr. Gurley's speech, some 367,470 American
workers were involved in elections to change their union bargaining
agent. Of the elections held, 52 per cent resulted in turning out the
incumbent in favor of a different union.127  Still another remedy is
available to the dissatisfied member. Within the period covered by the
company-union collective bargaining agreement he can vote out (de-
certify) a union by a procedure which is identical to the one by which he
voted in the union. In the seven year period preceding Mr. Gurley's
speech, there were a total of 2,804 "decertification" elections, in 68 per
cent of which the union was voted out. 128 Two experienced observers,
after independent studies, reached the identical conclusion that the
rank and file union member "is given adequate opportunity to elect the
people who, directly or indirectly, participate in the negotiations with
the employers"' 29 and that although some unions are more democratic
than others, "even in the most autocratic union, the rank and file still
has the power to sweep union leadership out of office."' 180
The only instance when union members do not have ample opportuni-
ty to rid themselves of union leadership they dislike is when local law
enforcement permits hooliganism to run rampant. This situation has
nothing to do with the existence or non-existence of right-to-work laws.
Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell made this perfectly clear on the
broadcast "Meet The Press" when asked the following question by
reporter May Craig:
Mrs. Craig: May I ask you this: Don't you think it is the
closed shop and the union shop that has made it possible for the
corruption and the exploitation of members revealed in the Mc-
Clellan Committee?
Secretary Mitchell: No, I don't think there is any relation-
ship, Mrs. Craig, and let me tell you why; the McClellan Com-
mittee exposures have in the main revolved around such things
as arson, gun-toting, extortion, even murder, all things which are
now illegal under federal, state, and local laws. A great deal of
the material which comes before the McClellan Committee has to
do with the violation of existing laws; violence, for example.
In the state of Tennessee, which is a right-to-work state, the
McClellan Committee discovered 173 cases of violence, gangster-
"' Krislov, Raiding Among The "Legitinate" Unions, 8 IND. & LAB. REL. REV.
19 (1954).
2' Note, A Survey of Decertification Under the National Labor Relations Act,
29 TEMP. L.Q. 454, 457-58 (1956).
129 Shister, Who Controls Union Policies, in READINGS IN LABOR EcoNoMics
AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 219 (1951).13 WITNEy, GOVERNMENT AND CoLrcrivE BARGAINING 10 (1951).
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ism and hoodlumism. Some of the most violent reactions we
have had in labor strife-and I will give you the names of the
strikes-the Southern Bell strike of two years ago. The Louis-
ville and Nashville Railroad strike of a couple of years ago
incited violence, rioting and all the other things which are bad.
These are all right-to-work states.1
3 1
The introduction of the union shop has been known to eliminate
racketeering. In the maritime industries, for example, the "shape up,"
a method of recruitment whereby job applicants assemble and are
selected by employer representatives, led to kick-backs, loan-sharks, and
ultimate corruption in many forms. All this was eliminated by the
closed shop. "'The introduction of the union hiring hall," remarked the
Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, "has been
the single most constructive step in establishing a measure of orderly
labor-management relations on the widespread waterfronts of the United
States.' 382 It might also be noted that the International Typographical
Union and the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, two
unions long associated with the closed shop, have enviable records for
internal union democracy and freedom from communism, gangsterism
and corruption.
One employer, the President of U.S. Industries, Inc., suggested that
it is the enactment of right-to-work laws, not the closed shop, which
leads to corruption in union leadership. He reasoned this way:
As an employer, I put the issue on the basis of the importance
to me of encouraging full participation in the union and of not
offering money incentives to stay out.
The obligation to pay dues carries with it the right to go to
union meetings and complain if things are not going the way they
should. If I were an employee, I would want to preserve that
right at all costs and particularly if I did not like the way the union
was being run.
By encouraging employees to stay away, the advocates of the
"right-to-work" laws are actually entrenching in power the leader-
ship they claim needs regulation.
8 3
Without examining further the contention that the union shop
increases internal union democracy, the facts remain that (1) union
members have ample opportunity to rid themselves of union leaders
they dislike, an opportunity which has been and is now being exercised;
.. Interview with Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell, August 31, 1958,
printed in pamphlet issued by National Council for Industrial Peace, 1426 G
Street, N.W., Washington 5, D. C.
" Hearings on Taft-Hartley Act Revisions before the Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 505 (1953).
. Address by John I. Snyder, Jr., to the Second Annual Industrial Relations
Conference, printed in AFL-CIO, UNION SHOP AND THE Pusuc WELFARE 47
(1958).
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and that (2) right-to-work laws to date have had no effect in the elimi-
nation of corrupt union leadership. The question of corruption in
high places is not a question of right-to-work laws but one of establishing
necessary "police" legislation to allow prosecution of wrongdoers.
ARE RIGHT-To-WoRK LAWS NECESSARY To PROTECT
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM?
The issues discussed above, are of secondary importance. The
primary issue in the right-to-work law fight is the morality of the union
shop. "The typical spokesman for employers opposing the union closed
shop usually reckons with his audience and asserts that the closed shop
is un-American, that it keeps the non-union man out of work or compels
him to join the union in order to secure employment. This, he says,
deprives the worker of an inalienable right."'u 4 Proponents of the
Florida right-to-work law in 1943 emphasized "the right-to-work with-
out being compelled to pay tribute to any man or organization"'u 5 and
the Farm Bureau editorialized that:
A man in free America is no longer free to work where he
will, when he will, and for whom he will. No, he must, if he
would live and support his family, join a union, pay an initiation
fee at least once and pay dues through payroll deduction. 180
Proponents of the law comment that "No other private organization has
the right to conscript members"' 8 7 and also point out that (1) an
individual's religious conviction may prevent his membership in a
union and that (2) a union member's dues may be used to support a
political candidate he dislikes.38s Opponents of right-to-work laws
belittle the importance of the "right" protected by right-to-work laws
and impugn the motives of their proponents. The famous Mr. Dooley
put it this way:
"What's all this that's in the papers about the open shop"
asked Mr. Hennessey.
"Why, don't you know?" said Mr. Dooley, "Really, I'm
MILLIS and MONTGOMERY, ORGANIZED LABOR 483 (1945).
1 35 SHoTT, How 'RIGHT-To-WORK' LAWS ARE PASSED, FLORiDA SETS THlE
PATTERN 32 (1956).
'"Id. at 27. When the right-to-work law was introduced into the Florida
legislature it was opposed by the representatives from urban districts (where the
closed shop was in operation) and favored by a margin of 5 to 1 by the representa-
tives of the rural districts who were unacquainted with the practices and actuali-
ties of industrial labor-management relations. Id. at 77. In Virginia the right-to-
work law was opposed by the representatives of the industralized areas and
passed by the votes of those from the rural areas. Kuhlman, Right-To-Work
Laws: The Virginia Experience, 6 LAB. L.J. 453, 454 (1955). This accords
with the conclusion that the employer with the union shop agreement is far more
apt to want it than is the employer with no first-hand information. See text at
note 79 supra.
"' SULTAN, RIGET To WORK LAWS: A SrtmY IN CONFLiCr 65 (1958).
"'Id. at 67-68.
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surprised at yer ignorance, Hennessey. What is th' open shop?
Sur, 'tis where they kape the doors open to accommodate th'
constant stream av min coming in t' take jobs cheaper than th' min
what has th' jobs. 'Tis like this, Hennessey: Suppose wan av
these freeborn citizens is workin' in an open shop for th' princely
wages av wan large iron dollar a day av tin hour. Along comes
anither son-av-a-gun and he sez t' th' boss, 'Oi think Oi could
handle th' job nicely f'r niney cints.' "Sure,' sez the boss, and th'
wan dollar man gets out into the crool woroudl t' exercise his
inalienable rights as a freeborn American citizen an' scab on some
other poor devil. An' so it goes on Hennessey. An' who gets the
benefit? True, it saves th' boss money, but he don't care no more
f'r money thin he does f'r his right eye.
"It's all principle wid him. He hates t' see men. robbed av
their indipindence. They must have their indipindence, regardless
av anything else."' 3 9
In like vein the late Clarence Darrow stated that:
There can be no inalienable right to work without a place to
work, and neither the government nor those who declare the
loudest or insist the most, have ever furnished the laborer a place
to toil. To this class the inalienable right to work means simply
the inalienable right of the employer, without let or hindrance,
to go out in the open market and bid for laborers on the hardest
terms, or rather, to so order the industrial world that men and
women and children must bid against each other for a right to
toil. The closed shop is the only means that experience has shown
to be essential to protect the liberty workingmen have already
won.14
0
Right-to-work law opponents point out that a union shop contract
democratically results from majority action by the employees and from
free collective bargaining between union and management. It is the
right-to-work laws, they contend, that are undemocratic as they force
employees to associate with persons they dislike141 and deprive em-
ployers of liberty to contract. 142 Answering other contentions, they say
that a union (unlike all other private organizations) is entitled to re-
quire all eligible persons to join because a union (unlike all other private
organizations) is required by law to represent all eligible persons.
IL" Literary Digest, Nov. 27, 1920.11o THE OPEN SHOP, an undated pamphlet quoted in CIO, THE CASE AGAINST
THE RIGHT-To-WORK LAWS at 77 (undated).
""To union people, the non-unionist "is nothing more than one who seeks
to reap where he has not sown, who wishes to enjoy benefits without burdens,
protection without taxation, security without sacrifice, and rights without risks."
TONER, THE CLOSED SHOP 169 (1942).
12 Alfred M. Landon, Republican candidate for President in 1936, came out
against the Kansas proposed right-to-work law because, as he stated: "The question
involved in this legislation is government interference with the independence of
both management and labor to negotiate whatever kind of contract they may agree
upon." Address of July 7, 1954 at Topeka, Kansas, quoted in AFL-CIO UNION
S cuiury at 96 (1958).
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Finally, they point out that compulsory unionism does not deprive mem-
bers of political freedom as the expenditure of union dues for political
purpose is an integral part of necessary union functions14 3 (subject to
check by majority action) and in any event is greatly circumscribed by
the Taft-Hartley Act.144
What are the merits of these respective arguments? The issue of
individual freedom, unlike the issues previously discussed, does not lend
itself to an evidentiary approach. All that can be done, other than
restate the contesting arguments, is to point out the following: Con-
stitutionally, there is no objection to either a law which bans the union
shop or to a law which permits a union shop. 145 Ethically, the clergy
are divided; but most of the organized religious groups'4 6 and most of
the articulate clergymen 147 who speak favor the union shop. The
American Civil Liberties Union maintains a hands-off policy with the
statement that the considerations involved "range over economic, po-
litical and social fields, but are outside the civil liberties field."'148
CONCLUSION
The union shop contract is essential to the very existence of unions
in some industries, and conducive to better labor-managment relations
in all. The overwhelming majority of employees affected want the
union shop, as do those employers with first-hand experience. The
evidence indicates that there is no valid reason why the payment of
union dues as a basis of continued employment should not be left to
agreement by management and labor through the process of collective
bargaining.
The arguments most commonly advanced in support of right-to-work
laws have no basis in fact. Right-to-work laws do not attract new
industry that adds to the prosperity of a state; do not curtail the
Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
14 Section 304 makes it illegal for a labor union to make a "contribution or ex-
penditure in connection with any election . . . or in connection with any primary
election or political convention or caucus to select candidates." 61 STAT. 159
(1947), 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1950). In United States v. International, UAW, 352
U.S. 567 (1957), the Court held that an indictment under this act which alleged
that a labor union expended funds from its general treasury to sponsor a television
broadcast "urging and endorsing" the election of candidates for national office
was sufficient.
14 Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
14 See, e.g., Division of Christian Life and Work of the National Council of
Churches; The Board of Social and Economic Relations of the Methodist Church;
The Rabbinical Council of America; and the Catholic Committee of The South,
AFL-CIO, UNioN SECURInY 102-07 (1958).
1" See, e.g., Archbishop Rummel of New Orleans; Bishop Oxnam, President
of the Methodist Church Council of Bishops; Rev. Dr. Walter Muelder, Dean of
the Boston University School of Theology; Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr of Union
Theological Seminary; Rabbi Abba Silver of Cleveland; and the Ver. Rev.
Francis B. Sayre, Jr., Episcopal Dean of the Washington Cathedral. Ibid.
... News Release of Feb. 17, 1955, quoted Id. at 78.
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number of strikes; are not necessary to curtail alleged union abusive
or discriminatory exclusionary policies; and are not necessary to enable
employees to rid themselves of, and otherwise have had no effect on,
corrupt union leadership.
The Taft-Hartley union shop does not require the individual em-
ployee to comply with union policy, or even to join the union. It only
requires him, if employed in a shop where the union and management
have negotiated a union security agreement, to pay his proportionate
share of the union expenses. There seems no valid reason why this
individual's asserted freedom to refrain from paying his share of the
costs (usually an amount equivalent to two hours' pay) should be given
preference to the asserted freedom of union members not to associate
themselves with a person they consider a "free rider." To this con-
clusion the writer would make one exception: the employee whose re-
ligious beliefs and moral scruples prevent him from making financial
contributions to a union should not be discharged for exercising his
rights of conscience. This individual, however, should be required to
demonstrate his good faith by paying an amount equivalent to union dues
to a charitable organization mutually acceptable to the employee and
the union.149
The current right-to-work law drive is not without precedent. In
1903, the NAM sponsored an "Open Shop" drive (open the shop to
non-union employees).150 Following World War I employer organiza-
tions sponsored the "American Plan" (abolish the "un-American"
closed shop). 151 Following World War II we have witnessed the
"right-to-work" movement. The underlying purpose of all these drives
is to hamstring union effectiveness. 152 So long as unions must fight for
... The United Auto Workers and other unions follow this practice by agree-
ment with religious organizations whose members are employed in plants organized
by the union. Testimony of Walter Reuther, Hearings Before the Select Com-
mittee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 25 at 10102 (1958). Legally, there is no requirement that this be
done. In Otten v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953),
Judge Learned Hand held that "the First Amendment gives no one the right to
insist that in the pursuit of their own interests others must conform their conduct
to his own religious necessities .... We must accommodate our idiosyncrasies,
religious as well as secular, to the compromises necessary in communal life; and
we can hope for no reward for the sacrifices this may require beyond our satisfac-
tion from within, or our expectations of a 'better world."
!o The open shop was open to all but the union member. The featured speaker
at the 1905 NAM convention advised its members to "discharge union men
promptly" and in 1906 Bethlehem Steel refused to sell its products to contractors
who employed union men. AFL-CIO, UNiON SEcURITY 45 (1958).
"I While the older, longer-established unions were able to withstand this
attack, the open shop drive completely wiped out the war born unions in the steel
and southern coal industries. Id. at 47.
..2 The Florida right-to-work drive got under way following a CIO effort to
organize the workers in the citrus industry. Opponents of the right-to-work law
found it significant that officers of the Right-To-Work Committee "come entirely
from the backward, low-wage sections of the state, where the lumber and turpentine
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the right to exist, so long as the principle of good faith collective bar-
gaining is denied in large quarters, 153 unions need and should have the
freedom to protect themselves by permission to negotiate for and enter
into union security agreements.
interests rule their workers like barons of old, and laborers receive little or nothing
for working in groves and on the farms." Saorr, op. cit. mLpra note 135, at 31.
"'In 1947, the year of Taft-Hartley and 10 state right-to-work laws, the
NLRB received 4,232 complaints that employers had deprived employees of their
right to join unions. Twelve per cent of these were filed from the South Atlantic
states as contrasted with 6.2% from the New England States, 6.9% from the
West North Central states, and 2.0% from the Mountain states. Industrywise,
food and kindred products accounted for 10.5%, textile-mill products, 4.3%; ap-
parel and other finished products, 3.2%; as contrasted with aircraft industry, .9%;
coal mining, .3%; and construction, .7%. 12 NLRB ANt. RFP. 68-70 (1948).
In 1948, the Labor Board reported that: "Section 8(1) of the act forbids
employers to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7.... This was the provision of the act as to which
violations were most frequently alleged and found.... Id. at 24.
The current NLRB annual report recites that "The most common charge
against employers continued to be that of illegally discriminating against em-
ployees because of their union activities. . . . Employers were charged with
having engaged in such discrimination in 4,649 cases filed during the 1958 fiscal
year." Twenty-Third Ann. Rep. of the NLRB 4 (1959). Once again the food
industry leads in the total number of such complaints, with a totally disproportionate
number in the textile, apparel, lumber, and furniture industries. Id. at 147.
The South Atlantic states were the source of 5 times the number of such com-
plaints than the Mountain states, 4 times the number than the New England states,
3 times the number than the West North Central states, and twice the number than
the Pacific states. Id. at 148.'
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